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THE BANK BEGAN TREATING THEM BADLY: PLAINS
COMMERCE BANK, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE
FUTURE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Cullen D. Sweeney*
. Introduction
The sovereign status of Indian tribes in the United States is an endangered
species in the menagerie of legal ideals: everywhere stalked, cornered, and
assailed by arrows of law. Existing at the sufferance of the judiciary, the
Indian sovereignty that was once a monument of inherent strength has become
a hunted and harrowed thing. In Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land
& Cattle Co.,' the United States Supreme Court held that Indian tribes lack
authority to regulate sales of non-Indian-owned fee land located within
reservation boundaries and by that same token also lack power to adjudicate
disputes arising from those transactions.2
This note argues that the Court's decision in Plains Commerce Bank
represents another significant step in the steady erosion not only of Indian
sovereignty but also of the Court's foundational principles of Indian law.3
This has not happened accidentally. By tightly circumscribing the ability of
tribes to regulate the activities of nonmembers while upon
reservations-activities bearing directly on tribal interests-the Court has
deliberately subjugated the rights of tribes to the rights of outsiders on their
own land. In stripping tribes of key sovereign powers of self-determination
and autonomy through misguided fiat, the Court also substantially forecloses
the possibility of genuine social, political, and economic progress on
reservations. It creates a cycle of weakness and dependency: everything, in
short, that a strong and meaningful sovereignty would never countenance.
This note's overarching arguments are threefold. First, despite the
abundantly chronicled mistreatment of Indians during the settlement of the
United States, the Supreme Court crafted a legal doctrine which, even if
largely only in theory, acknowledged an inherent, substantial, and largely
unbroken tribal sovereignty. Second, Plains Commerce Bank stands as the

* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008).
2. Id. at 2714.
3. See WILLIAM C. CANBY,
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current culmination of the modem Supreme Court's efforts, now thirty years
in the making, to diminish and destabilize Indian sovereignty through a
jurisprudence that respects neither stare decisis nor the rights of tribes to exist
as self-defining (albeit fully accountable) polities within the boundaries of the
United States. Third, the economic viability (and thus the continued existence)
of Indian tribes can be guaranteed only through a legitimate, binding
recognition of their sovereign and inalienable rights-a recognition the Court
today obdurately refuses to afford.
With Plains Commerce Bank the Supreme Court has doubly erred. First,
with a casuistry bordering on contempt, the Court unapologetically misreads
its own modem standard for the valid exercise of tribal civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers, as set forth in 198 1's landmark case Montana v. United States.'
Secondly and equally damagingly, the Court manipulates the criteria for
consent to tribal court jurisdiction, robbing tribes of the power to create and
cultivate effective legal institutions on reservations. By yoking dubiously
interpreted precedent in service of questionable policy, the Court has ushered
into the annals of jurisprudence a decision that works to the undeniable
detriment of tribes while lavishing ill-gained benefits on possibly exploitative
outsiders.
First, the foundation: Part II of this note chronicles the history of the
Supreme Court's major Indian law decisions from its first significant
pronouncement on the subject, by Chief Justice John Marshall in 1823's
Johnson v. M'Intosh,5 and thereby traces to the Marshall Era a broad judicial
acknowledgment of the substantial panoply of rights retained by Indian tribes
within their reserved territories over Indians and non-Indians alike. The
second half of Part II summarizes the (quite literally) unprecedented sea
change in the Court's conceptualization of Indian sovereignty over recent
decades, a shift manifesting a less-than-subtle determination to relegate tribal
sovereignty to the status of quaint historical relic-a begrudging nod to the
benighted but harmless traditions of an alien enclave in the midst of a world
that has long since passed it by.
Part III examines the most recent manifestation of this anti-autonomy tack
in Supreme Court jurisprudence, Plains Commerce Bank, through that case's
facts and procedural history, issues, and holding. Part IV discusses how
unstable precedent and flawed policy coalesced in PlainsCommerce Bank into
a presumptive jettisoning of Indian sovereign powers both regulatory and
adjudicatory over non-Indians on reservations, even when logic and experience
4. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
5. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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dictate that such assertions of authority are of paramount importance to
compelling tribal interests. By misapplying Montana6 and holding that tribes
do not possess regulatory authority over non-Indian-owned fee land sales
involving non-Indians within reservation boundaries-and that tribal courts
thus lack authority to adjudicate claims arising from a non-Indian's sale of fee
land'-the Court in PlainsCommerce Bank has intentionally blinded itself to
the insistent truth that a people's control over their own land is inextricably
linked to their continued vitality as a functioning political unit. By weakening
the traditional legal underpinnings of tribal sovereignty, the Supreme Court
has created the ideal conditions for a devastating reduction in the ability of
tribes to govern not only non-Indians, but even their own members.
Part V proposes that the only viable outlet for a tribe's meaningful
confrontation with the social problems, political realities, and economic
demands of the modem United States is through an ironclad judicial and
legislative recognition of a robust, inviolable Indian autonomy. To deprive
Indian tribes of the practical ability to manage their own interests, even though
those interests may sometimes bear materially on the rights of non-Indians, is
to force those tribes into stagnation, isolation, and irrelevance as viable
political entities within the greater boundaries of the United States. Poverty
and hopelessness must be the expected, if not the intended, result of such
impotence. And with that result achieved, the ability of tribes ever to reassert
their true sovereign powers would be rendered a cruel and farcical nullity. The
ideals of American democracy, the ingenuity of American economics, and the
integrity of American law would be enhanced, not enervated, by embracing a
resurgent tribal sovereignty drawn within parameters of reason rather than
outmoded racial rancor. This note concludes in Part VI.
II. The Supreme Court and TribalSovereignty,pre-Plains Commerce Bank
A. The Marshall Trilogy
The foundations of Supreme Court Indian law jurisprudence find their
genesis in three landmark opinions written by Chief Justice John Marshall,
generally known as the Marshall Trilogy: Johnson v. M'Intosh,8 Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia,9 and Worcester v. Georgia.10 Collectively, these decisions

6. 450 U.S. 544.
7.
8.
9.
10.

PlainsCommerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2714.
21 U.S, (8 Wheat.) 543.
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1(1831).
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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"fashion[ed] legal doctrines that would influence Indian Law for the next century
and a half."' 1 Despite profound encroachments on tribal interests by the actions
of the executive and legislative branches, the Marshall formulation remained
basically untouched in Supreme Court case law until a series of decisions
radically reevaluating tribal sovereign powers began to issue forth in the late
1970s."
Chief Justice Marshall's 1823 Johnson opinion marked the first time "the
Supreme Court attempted to formulate its views of Indian tribes and their legal
and historical relation to the land."' 3 Indeed, the Johnson decision has been
called "without question, the most important Indian rights opinion ever issued
by any court of law in the United States."'"
In Johnson, Marshall
acknowledged that the insoluble historical fact of European conquest in the
Americas unavoidably subtracted from the absolute sovereignty formerly
exerted by Indian tribes: their sovereign rights were "necessarily, to a
considerable extent, impaired."' 5 Marshall, however, defines the scope of this
"impairment" in language directly suggesting a diminishment far less
substantial than the limitations perceived by today's Court by narrowly
framing the loss of sovereign rights in terms of the unfettered alienability of
property. Though admitting Indian tribes to be the original "rightful occupants
of the soil," Marshall explained that those tribes' "rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their
power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased,
was denied by the original fundamental
principle, that discovery gave
'6
exclusive title to those who made it.'
At the outset, the irony of Marshall's statement about the "discovery" of
America must be accepted as articulating a historical fait accompli that, no
matter how bitter, exists beyond argument, irrevocably engrained in the grand
narrative of the United States. For the purposes of this note, the pragmatic
significance of Marshall's opinions instead flows from his explicit
enumeration of sovereign rights lost by Indian tribes. Moreover, an
examination of the principal tenets of Indian policy at the time of the United
11. CANBY, supra note 3, at 14.
12. Id.at 76; see also COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 220 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., Michie 2005) [hereinafter COHEN] ("[B]eginning in 1978, the Supreme
Court has substantially limited tribal power over nonmembers.").
13. CANBY, supra note 3, at 14.
14. ROBERT A. WILLAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN
RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 51 (2005).

15. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
16. Id.
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States' founding reveals the official recognition that "the Indian territory was
entirely the province of the tribes, and they had jurisdiction in fact and theory
over all persons and subjects present there."' 7
After narrowing the bounds of Indian sovereignty by curtailing tribes'
ability freely to alienate their land, Marshall later went on, in Worcester v.
Georgia,8 to introduce a closely linked corollary to the Johnson limitation.
Having earlier characterized Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations,"' 9
Marshall asserted Indian tribes had "retain[ed] their original natural rights, as
the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from
20
intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer.
Additionally, Marshall affirmed that a "nation" meant "a people distinct from
others,,2' a category 22as readily applicable to Indian tribes as "to the other
nations of the earth.,

Through the trilogy of Johnson, Cherokee Nation, and Worcester, the
Supreme Court established under the aegis of Chief Justice Marshall "a view
of the tribes as nations whose independence had been limited in only two
essentials-the conveyance of land and the ability to deal with foreign
powers., 23 Rather than regarding Indian sovereignty as a feeble fiction vainly
clutched by a broken people, the Supreme Court instead recognized tribes as
retaining an inherent nationhood imbued with rights that had definitely not
been wholly bent to the conqueror's will. Though the reality of conquest and
"discovery" remained unavoidable for the tribes and the Court, Chief Justice
Marshall displays an emphatic willingness to consider Indian tribes as distinct
and self-contained polities within the greater corpus of the United States. To
the extent tribal interests did not directly offend the federal government's own
sovereign interests by signing treaties with foreign nations or selling land "to
whomsoever they pleased,"24 Indian autonomy within the boundaries of their
own territory remained, in the established view of the Supreme Court, intact.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

CANBY, supra note 3, at 133.
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,17 (183 1).
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
Id.
Id.at 560.
CANBY, supra note 3, at 74.
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
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B. The Modern Supreme Court'sErosion of Indian Sovereignty
The limitations on inherent tribal sovereignty established in the Marshall
Trilogy guided judicial principle during the entire course of America's
westward expansion and development: "For nearly 150 years following the
Cherokee cases, no additional limitations on tribal sovereignty were found to
inhere in domestic dependent status."2 5 In 1978, however, the Court suddenly
struck a profound and unexpected blow against established understandings of
Indian sovereign authority by holding that "Indians do not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of such power by
Congress. 2 6 Though acknowledging that "Indian tribes do retain elements of
'quasi-sovereign' authority after ceding their lands to the United States and
announcing their dependence on the federal government, 27 then-Justice
Rehnquist found a tribe's assertion of criminal jurisdiction over criminal acts
committed by non-Indians within reservations to be impermissible given that
the tribes are "fully subordinated to the sovereignty of the United States. 28
The logic of Oliphant hinged upon the Court's newfound obeisance,
trumpeted with a proselyte's zeal, to the "implicit conclusion"2 9 and
"commonly shared presumption of Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower
federal courts that tribal courts do not have the power to try non-Indians."3
In so peremptorily stripping tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
Oliphant necessarily relied on the nebulous "authority" of implication and
presumption, for no such deprivation of sovereign rights had ever been
sounded explicitly, neither through statute nor through the foundational edicts
of the Marshall Trilogy.3 Absent any direct grounding in statute or case law,
Oliphant'spronouncements on Indian sovereignty exist as a sort of judicial
virgin birth, unable to claim precedent as patrimony, supported only by the
Court's unblinking certitude in proclaiming a tribe's criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians as "inconsistent with their status."32 Through an act of judicial

25. CANBY, supranote 3, at 76.
26. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 211.
29. Id.at 204.
30. Id. at 206.
31. See CANBY, supra note 3, at 76-77.
32. Oliphant,435 U.S. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir.
1976), rev'd, Oliphant v. Suquanish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)). Curiously, the Court
in Oliphantenthusiastically adopted the letter but not the logic of the Ninth Circuit's opinion.
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prestidigitation unburdened by the constraining niceties of stare decisis, the
Oliphant Court blazed a trail for "discovering" new limitations on inherent
tribal sovereignty, guided neither by the lessons of history nor the precepts of
law, but rather by a barely concealed hostility to a tribe's right to realize its
own vision of its own future. From its inception, "Oliphant represented a
significant potential threat to tribal governmental power. The threat was not
long in being realized."33
Three years after Oliphant unceremoniously limited the scope of tribal
criminal jurisdiction, the Court applied the same rationale to circumscribe
tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians in Montana v. United States.34
Montanaemployed "the principles on which [Oliphant]relied ' 35 to deny tribes
the civil authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on nonIndian-owned fee land within a reservation.36 Montana, like Oliphant before
it, rooted its reasoning in "the general proposition that the inherent sovereign
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the
tribe. ' 37 Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart elaborated on this novel
rethinking of tribal sovereign status that originated in Oliphant,asserting that
the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent
status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional
delegation. 3 8
In light of this newly minted "general proposition"39 limiting inherent Indian
sovereignty, Montanathen sets forth two situations-exceptions-where tribes
may still permissibly "exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over nonIndians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands"4 ':
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also
The Court did notjust borrow but actually added emphasis to the phrase "inconsistent with their
status"--andthen turned the Ninth Circuit's words against it, reversing that court's judgment
affirming tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian violators of tribal law on reservations.
33. CANBY, supra note 3, at 77.

34. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.at 565.
Id.at 566.
Id. at 565.
Id.at 564.
Id.at 565.
Id.
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retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.4
Holding that hunting and fishing by non-Indians on the reservation fee lands
in question neither established a commercial relationship nor created a
situation that would "so threaten the Tribe's political or economic security as
to justify tribal regulation," ' 2 Montana laid the groundwork and provided the
analytical apparatus to justify the modem Court's antipathy toward a
meaningful assertion of tribal civil jurisdiction on reservation lands.
As interpreted by today's Court, the Montana decision. casts a long and
stifling shadow over the reasonable boundaries of Indian sovereignty. Though
Montana could stand only on the dwarfish shoulders of Oliphant for
precedential legitimacy, and though on its specific facts the case only
"announced an exception to the general rule that a tribe has governmental
power over its territory unless some statute or treaty takes it away, subsequent
Supreme Court opinions have tended to refer to the 'Montana rule,' not the
'Montana exception.' ' 3 Not only does Montana"continu[e] to gain strength,"
but it actually "appears to have become the foundation case for contemporary
Indian law in the Supreme Court." 44 As such, Montana has become a
formidable barrier to tribal authority, its "exceptions" molded and manipulated
by a Court today thoroughly disinclined to acknowledge the genuine extent of
tribal interests.
The Court's aggressive reluctance to recognize substantial tribal sovereign
rights, besides standing contrary to established precedent, also clashes with
current executive and legislative trends in fostering Indian sovereignty:
In the modem era, Congress and the executive branch have
reaffirmed the core principle of federal Indian law, that apart from
alienating tribal land and treating with foreign nations, Indian tribes
retain their original inherent sovereign authority over all persons,
property, and events within Indian country unless Congress clearly
and unambiguously acts to limit the exercise of that power.45

41. Id.at 565-66 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 566.
43. CANBY, supra note 3, at 78.
44. Id.
45. COHEN, supra note 12, at 224-25. In one particularly noteworthy instance, Congress
acted promptly to supersede the Court after it held, contrary to historical tradition and legal
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With the support of neither established precedent nor legislative intent nor
official public policy to bulwark its aversion to meaningful Indian sovereignty,
today's Court instead must rely upon "a judicially crafted theory" of "implicit
divestiture"4' 6 to "creat[e] policy-driven limitations on inherent tribal
powers."4' 7 Conveniently for today's Court, this theory's murky origins permit
it considerable malleability.
The 1978 decision of United States v. Wheeler refers to a "sovereign
power.., which the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status"
and also notes that "[t]he areas in which such implicit divestiture of
sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations
between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe."4 Based on Wheeler's
facts, however, the context of these pronouncements suggests something far
less promethean than the judicial advocates of implicit divestiture would care
to admit.49 Despite grave concerns that the continued application of
Montana's reasoning to set the boundaries of tribal authority "is inconsistent
with this Court's past decisions and undermines the Federal Government's
longstanding commitment to the promotion of tribal autonomy,"50 a generation
of Justices have now used Montana's "general proposition"'" to cudgel and
curb tribal sovereign rights.

precedent, that tribes lacked sovereign authority even over other Indians on reservations. Duro
v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), supersededbystatute,25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized
in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
46. COHEN, supra note 12, at 225.
47. Id. at 228.
48. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (holding the criminal prosecution
of a tribal member in federal court not barred by Double Jeopardy Clause of Fifth Amendment
when tribal defendant previously had been convicted of lesser-included offense in tribal court).
49. See Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,452 n.3 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Wheeler simply stands for the uncontroversial proposition that
those specific aspects of inherent sovereignty that necessarily have been divested (criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, alienation of land, and foreign relations) involve tribal relations
with non-Indians."). In other words, Wheeler's invocation of implicit divestiture does nothing
more remarkable than restate the Court's traditional understanding of Indian sovereignty as set
forth in the Marshall Trilogy, each case of which the Wheeler majority directly cites for support.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326. The Court's acolytes of implicit divestiture have probably built their
house upon sand.
50. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 448 (plurality opinion) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
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In recent years, the rationale born of Oliphan?2 and Montana has led to a
string of holdings that Indian tribes lack the civil authority to: zone
nonmember-owned fee land embraced within reservation boundaries,'
regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on reservation lands appropriated by
the federal government for public works projects,55 adjudicate civil actions
arising from accidents on state highways running through a tribal reservation,56
and hear civil claims stemming from a state official's tortious conduct against
a tribal member on the tribe's own land.57 Additionally, the Court has held
that, though a county may impose an ad valorem property tax on Indian-owned
fee land within reservations," a tribe may not impose an occupancy tax on
non-Indian guests of a hotel located on nonmember-owned reservation fee
land.5 9 With PlainsCommerce Bank' 0 the Court again beats its insistent basso
ostinato against Indian sovereignty-a drumbeat of conquest continued by
other means.
I1.Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.
A. Facts and ProceduralPostureof the Case
Ronnie and Lila Long owned and operated the Long Family Land and
Cattle Company (the Long Company), a ranching and farming operation, on
the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation in north-central South Dakota.6 '
The Longs, a married couple, are members of the Cheyenne River Sioux
Indian Tribe and longstanding customers of Plains Commerce Bank (the
Bank), a non-tribal South Dakota bank "located some 25 miles off the
reservation as the crow flies., 62 In the late 1980s, Ronnie Long's father, a
non-Indian, arranged for a commercial loan to the Long Company from the

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
Montana, 450 U.S. 544.
Brendale,492 U.S. at 428 (plurality opinion).
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 697 (1993).
Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2001).
County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 267-68 (1992).
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645,.659 (2001).
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S.Ct. 2709 (2008).
Id.at 2714-15.
Id. at2715.
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Bank.63 Under the loan agreement, the elder Long mortgaged 2230 acres of
Long Company fee land located within the reservation's boundaries."
By the time of the elder Long's death in 1995, he and the Long Company
were heavily indebted to the Bank. 65 The next year, Ronnie and Lila Long
obtained a "fresh" loan from the Bank whereby the Longs avoided foreclosure
on their ranching operation by deeding to the Bank the elder Long's previously
mortgaged land.' Upon deeding the 2230 acres to the Bank, the Longs
received from the Bank a two-year lease on the deeded land, with an option to
purchase the land at the end of two years for $468,000.67
It was "at this point, the Longs claim, that the Bank began treating them
badly. '6' After a "punishing winter" resulted in heavy loss of livestock, the
Longs could not afford to exercise their option to purchase the land deeded to
the Bank two years earlier.69 Consequently, the Bank commenced an eviction
proceeding against the Longs in state court and additionally petitioned the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court to serve the Longs their eviction notice.7 °
The Longs steadfastly refused to leave their ranch.7
As the Bank continued to pursue eviction proceedings against the Longs,
it also initiated the sale of a piece of the Long Company land to a non-Indian
couple.72 Finally, despite the Longs' continued occupancy, the Bank in 1999
sold the remaining acreage to two non-Indians.73 A month after this final sale
to the non-Indians by the Bank, the Longs and the Long Company sued the
Bank in the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court.74 The Longs asserted claims
against the Bank for, among other things, breach of contract and
discrimination.7 5 Most salient among these was the Longs' discrimination
claim, alleging the Bank had offered its nonmember customers much more
favorable terms of sale than those imposed on the Longs.7 6 The Bank

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at2715-16.
Id.
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answered, counterclaimed, and sought summary judgment, while
simultaneously asserting the tribal court did not possess jurisdiction to hear the
case.7" The tribal court found it had jurisdiction and the case proceeded to jury
trial.7"
The jury awarded the Longs $750,000 on the discrimination claim, plus two
of the additional claims. The tribal court affirmed the jury decision and
awarded interest." In a subsequent supplemental judgment, the tribal court
also granted the Longs an option to purchase the acreage they still occupied on
the same terms originally offered by the Bank, thereby negating the Bank's
sale of that parcel to nonmembers."s On appeal the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribal Court of Appeals affirmed."'
Having exhausted its remedies in tribal court, the Bank next commenced an
action in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota,
attempting to void the tribal court judgment on the basis of improper
jurisdiction. 2 The district court upheld the tribal court's jurisdiction, finding
the Bank's repeated dealings with the Longs brought the Bank within the
scope ofthe Montana"consensual relationship" exception permitting assertion
of tribal authority over nonmembers.8 3
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit subsequently affirmed the
district court's judgment." Under the Eighth Circuit's reasoning, "the Bank
effectively consented to substantive regulation by the tribe," rendering the
"antidiscrimination tort claim . .

.

just another way of regulating the

commercial transactions between the parties." 5 Thus, the Eighth Circuit
found that Montana permitted tribal civil jurisdiction in a consensual
commercial context.8 6 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.87
B. Issue
In Plains Commerce Bank, the Supreme Court considered "whether [a]
tribal court had jurisdiction to adjudicate a discrimination claim concerning [a]

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 2716.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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non-Indian bank's sale of fee land it owned."8 In determining whether to
uphold tribal court jurisdiction, the Court employed the rubric of the two
"Montana exceptions.., that would allow an extension of tribal authority to
regulate nonmembers on non-Indian fee land."89 In addition to the principal
issue at bar, the Court addressed as a threshold issue whether the Bank had
standing to challenge the jurisdiction of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal
Court. 9 Relatedly, the Court also assessed whether "the Bank consented to
tribal court jurisdiction over the discrimination claim by seeking the assistance
of tribal courts in serving a notice to quit" upon the Longs.9'
C. Decision of the Court
1. Holding
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a five-Justice majority, held that "the
Tribal Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Longs' discrimination claim because
92
the Tribe lacks the civil authority to regulate the Bank's sale of its fee land.
Before reaching its principal holding, the Court dispensed with the preliminary
objection that the Bank had no standing to challenge tribal court jurisdiction,
finding "the Bank was injured by the Tribal Court's exercise of jurisdiction
over the discrimination claim." 93 All the Justices, including the four
dissenters, joined in holding the Bank had standing to challenge the
jurisdiction of the tribal court. The majority also hastily disposed of the
Longs' contention that the Bank consented to the tribal court's jurisdiction by
availing itself of that court's assistance in service of process.94
Reaching the crux of the case, the majority refused to uphold tribal court
jurisdiction over the Bank. The Court found the Montana exceptions-the
judicially hewn exceptions acknowledging that "Indian tribes retain inherent
sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over nonIndians" 9 5 -to be "inapplicable." 96 Distinguishing "between sale of the land
' the Court held the first Montana exception (involving
and conduct on it,"97

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 2714.
Id. at 2720.
Id. at 2716.
Id. at 2727.
Id.at 2720.
Id.at 2718.
Id.at 2727.
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2727.
Id.at 2723.
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consensual commercial relationships between Indian tribal members and
nonmembers)" unavailing. 99 The Court likewise rejected application of the
second Montana exception (applicable to nonmember conduct that "threatens
or has some direct effect" on the tribe),"'0 asserting that a "sale of formerly
Indian-owned fee land to a third party... cannot fairly be called 'catastrophic'
for tribal self-government."' 01 In sum, Plains Commerce Bank holds that no
Indian tribe retains the sovereign power to regulate nonmember fee land sales
despite such land's location within the borders of the tribe's own reservation.
2. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion proceeds in three parts: Part I
recites the facts and procedural posture of the case, 0 2 Part II addresses the
issue of the Bank's standing, 0 3 and Part III offers apricisof tribal sovereignty
before delving into an analysis of the applicability of the Montanaexceptions,
followed by an assessment of the jurisdictional-consent issue."
After giving the statement of the case in the first part of his opinion, Chief
Justice Roberts next discussed the question of the Bank's standing, pointing
to the Justices' "independent obligation to assure ourselves that jurisdiction is
proper before proceeding to the merits" and to the fact "that whether a tribal
court has adjudicative authority over nonmembers is a federal question."'0' In
essence, the Longs had claimed the Bank did not suffer the requisite injury-infact that would permit federal question standing because the damages awarded
by the tribal jury were based upon the Longs' breach-of-contract claim, not the
discrimination claim presently before the Court. 0 6 Additionally, the Longs
argued the tribal court had not afforded them the full extent of their requested
relief when the tribal court voided the sale of only one of the fee land tracts,
rather than the entire parcel.0 7 Finally, the Longs argued the Bank would be
financially compensated (regardless of the voided sale) by re-selling land to
the Longs, thus suffering no actual loss. 0 8 Finding these arguments

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2725.
Montana,450 U.S. at 566.
Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2726.
Id. at 2714-16.
Id. at 2716-18.
Id. at 2718-27.
Id.at2716.
Id.at 2717.
Id.
Id.
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unpersuasive, Chief Justice Roberts noted that, based on the interrogatories on
the tribal court jury's verdict form, "the jury could have based its damages
award, in whole or in part, on the finding of discrimination."'' 9 Additionally,
the tribal court's nullification of the Bank's sale constituted a "judicially
imposed burden [that] certainly qualifies as an injury for standing purposes.""
The Bank's standing duly affirmed, the majority next arrived at the heart of
the matter. Chief Justice Roberts commenced Part Ill-the core of his
opinion-by spinning a narrative of judicially construed Indian sovereignty
narrowly tailored to justify the continued erosion of those sovereign rights.
Part III of the majority opinion begins by invoking the Marshall Trilogy
through Worcester v. Georgia's description of "Indian tribes as 'distinct,
independent political communities.' ' 1 Having briefly acknowledged the
ideal of sovereign tribal rights, the rest of Chief Justice Roberts's synthesis
reveals how emphatically (and recently) those rights have been diminished.
In doing so, Chief Justice Roberts treated as settled principle the OliphantMontana "general rule" that proclaims "tribes do not, as a general matter,
possess authority over non-Indians who come within their borders," a
presumption viewed as "particularly strong when the nonmember activity
occurs on land owned in fee simple by non-Indians."" 2
The majority opinion also looked to the historical fact of Indian allotment,
which "convert[ed] millions of acres of formerly tribal land into fee simple
parcels," noting also the paramount concept of fee simple property as a thing
fully and freely alienable." 3 Stating that "[o]ur cases have made clear that
once tribal land is converted into fee simple, the tribe loses plenary jurisdiction
over it,""' 4 Chief Justice Roberts introduced the two Montana exceptions,
which enumerate "circumstances in which tribes may exercise 'civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee
lands.""' 5 Despite the availability of the Montana exceptions to uphold the
exercise of tribal sovereignty over nonmembers, the Court does not readily
bestow the benefit of those exceptions: tribal attempts to regulate nonmember
conduct on non-Indian fee land will be "presumptively invalid"' 6 and the road
towards demonstrating such validity will be treacherous and difficult.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.at 2718.
Id. (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832)).
Id.at2719.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2720 (quoting Montana v.United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)).
Id. (quoting Atkinson Trading Co.v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001)).
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Though holding that "neither exception authorizes tribal courts to exercise
jurisdiction over the Longs' discrimination claim,""' 7 the lion's share of the
majority opinion deals with the inapplicability of the first Montana exception
alone. Here the Court hewed a fine distinction between the (permissible)
"tribal regulation of nonmember conduct inside the reservation that implicates
the tribe's sovereign interests"" 8 and the impermissible tribal regulation of
sales of non-Indian-owned fee land. For the majority, the distinction is crucial
because a sale is apparently neither "conduct" nor "activity" under Montana:
"Montana provides that, in certain circumstances, tribes may exercise authority
over the conduct of nonmembers, even if that conduct takes place on nonIndian fee land. But conduct taking place on the land and the sale of the land
are two very different things.""' 9 In effect, Montana's references to "the
activities of nonmembers" and "the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands"',2 do
not contemplate the Bank's sale of fee land within the reservation because
"sales" and "activities" are supposedly distinct categories. The Court expends
much ink in trying to force that difference.
Though conceding "certain forms of nonmember behavior, even on nonIndian fee land, may sufficiently affect the tribe as to justify tribal
oversight,"'' the Court explained that because the Bank's sale is neither
conduct nor activity nor use nor behavior in any colorable legal sense, the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court wielded jurisdiction improperly. Since the
non-Indian-owned fee land "has already been removed from the tribe's
immediate control,"'2 the sale of that land cannot implicate sovereign tribal
interests "because non-Indian fee parcels have ceased to be tribal land."' 23 By
the majority's unforgiving logic, the sale of non-Indian-owned fee land cannot
directly affect a tribe for the sole reason that the "direct harm to its political
integrity... is sustained at the point the land passes from Indian to non-Indian
hands.' ' 24 Later sales of the same parcel will thus cause no further harm.
While some "uses to which the land is put... may well affect the tribe and its
members," the act described by the Court as the "mere resale of... land" or
the "mere fact of resale" will, standing alone, work "no additional damage."' 25

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. at2721.
Id.at 2726.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
PlainsCommerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2723.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2723-24.
Id. at 2724.
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The Court followed by analyzing the issue of nonmember consent to tribal
authority in light of the first Montana exception. Nonmembers by definition
play no role in tribal governance. For this reason, a tribe's "laws and
regulations may be fairly imposed on nonmembers only if the nonmember has
consented, either expressly or by his actions."' 26 As tribal assertions of
sovereignty over nonmembers are "presumptively invalid,"'27 the first
Montana exception will be very narrowly applied in creating any justification
for tribal regulation.'28 Returning to the conduct/sale distinction, the Court
observed that, even though the Bank "had 'lengthy on-reservation commercial
relationships with the Long Company,"" 29 the Bank's sale of its nonmemberowned fee land in and of itself falls beyond the pale of the first Montana
30
exception.
Next, the Court turned to the applicability of the second Montana exception.
The majority rejected this basis for tribal sovereignty as well, finding the
"mere fact of resale"'' 3' does not "imperil the subsistence"' 32 of the tribe, the
apparent threshold for triggering the second Montana exception.
Characterizing the loss of the tribe's land as "quite possibly disappointing" but
not "catastrophic,"' 33 Chief Justice Roberts foreclosed the availability of the
second Montana exception. Lastly, the Court quickly disposed of the Longs'
argument "that the Bank consented to tribal court jurisdiction.. . by seeking
the assistance of tribal courts in serving a notice to quit."' 34 Observing "the
Bank promptly contended in its answer that the court lacked jurisdiction" upon
being sued by the Longs, Chief Justice Roberts found the earlier request for
tribal court assistance did not rise to the level of consent to tribal court
jurisdiction. 13' Accordingly, the36Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id. at 2720 (quoting Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001)).
Id. at 2724.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at2725.
Id. at 2724.
Id. at 2726 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566) (1981)).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 2727.
Id.
Id.
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3. The DissentingOpinion
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, dissented
from the judgment of the Court, though all concurred as to Part II (upholding
the Bank's standing to challenge tribal court jurisdiction) and to the Court's
ruling that the tribal court invalidly nullified the Bank's sale of fee land as
opposed to awarding damages as a remedy.'
Justice Ginsburg, though
accepting the "general rule" of Montana, believed the Longs' claim presented
"a clear case for application of Montana's first or 'consensual relationships'
exception," thus obviating the need for further analysis under the second
Montana exception.'3 8
The dissent emphasized the duration and depth of the Bank's business
relationship with the Longs and the Long Company, noting the Bank was "no
unwitting outsider forced to litigate under unfamiliar rules and procedures in
tribal court."' 39 The extent of the Bank's dealings with the Longs, coupled
with the fact that "the Bank regularly filed suit" in the tribal court, led Justice
Ginsburg to label the Court's holding, buttressed by its rigid distinction
between the sale of fee land and nonmember conduct on that land, as
"perplexing."'1' 4 Ultimately, the dissent insisted the case is a discrimination
claim, rooted in a long course of commercial dealing between the Bank and the
Longs, over which the tribal court rightfully possessed jurisdiction because of
a tribe's right under the first Montana exception "to shield its members against
discrimination by those engaging in on-reservation commercial
'4
relationships-including land-secured lending-with them.' '
1X Analysis
By declaring an Indian tribe lacks authority to adjudicate a claim arising
from the sale of non-Indian-owned fee land contained within the borders of
that tribe's reservation, 42 the Supreme Court manipulates its own precedent
in the service of a deeply flawed policy that will prove gravely detrimental not
only to the sovereignty but also to the very continued existence of Indian
tribes. Indeed, genuine sovereignty and meaningful existence are inseparable.
The Supreme Court erred, legally and morally, in two significant regards.
137. Id.(Ginsburg,J.,
dissenting).

138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
at 2728 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
at 2729 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
at 2731 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

142. Id.at 2714.
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First, the Court deliberately, even perversely, misreads Montana v. United
43 Second, the majority distorts the standard for consent to tribal court
States."'
jurisdiction, thereby allowing nonmembers, especially sophisticated business
entities like the Bank, to exploit tribes most in need of sustainable economic
development. Neither precedent nor public policy can support the Supreme
Court's calculated dismantlement of Indian sovereignty.
A. How (Not) to Read Montana
In reaching its holding the Court in Plains Commerce Bank relies heavily,
perhaps even exclusively, on its understanding of the two Montanaexceptions.
The Court accepts as settled law that Montana generally precludes tribal
assertion of authority over nonmembers.'
At this juncture such an
interpretation is most likely inescapable. Yet the Court goes one step further
by reading Montana's exceptions in a way that erects a nearly insurmountable
bar to their application, leaving the actual utility of the "exceptions" for tribes
in serious doubt. By drawing a labored and unconvincing distinction between
nonmember "conduct" on reservations and land sales and by imposing a
rigorous standard for demonstrating tribal harm that borders on open hostility,
today's Court denies Indian tribes a most exalted American ideal: free and
rational self-determination. Sophistry has trumped sovereignty. In the end,
it is perhaps not only the Indians who have lost.
1. Montana as "GeneralRule"
The Plains Commerce Bank majority readily adopts the position that
Montana established a "general rule" that "tribes do not.., possess authority
over non-Indians who come within their borders,"'45 this general rule being
"particularly strong when the nonmember's activity occurs on land owned in
fee simple by non-Indians.'"4 Indeed, even the Plains Commerce Bank
dissent calls Montana a "pathmarking case" and unblinkingly accepts the
majority's formulation of its "general rule."' 147 For all the authority invested
in its words, however, the precise principle of Indian sovereignty articulated
by Montana remains legitimately open to varying interpretation.
First, to read Montana as rendering "presumptively invalid"'14 all assertions

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

450 U.S. 544 (1981).
PlainsCommerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2718-19.
Id.at2718.
Id.at 2719.
Id. at 2728 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2720 (quoting Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001)
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of tribal authority over nonmembers, regardless of the fact that such conduct
occurs within the prescribed political boundaries of that tribe as a functioning
governmental unit, appears sharply to contradict the Marshall Trilogy's longensconced view of Indian tribes as discrete political entities-as nations.' 49
Inarguably, the Cheyenne River Sioux qualify, in the words of Chief Justice
Marshall, as "a distinct community occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described."'"5 As such, the Tribe deserves all the
sovereign rights of the specially situated "domestic dependent nation,"''
endowed with autonomy to the extent that its power of self-determination does
not directly threaten or offend the rights of the larger, conquering,
"discovering" sovereign, the United States of America.
Should the Cheyenne River Sioux decide to alienate the bulk of their tribal
lands to Canada or to sign a treaty with Cuba lifting embargoes on trade, the
Tribe would have surpassed the limits of its unique sovereign authority. Yet
an ocean of difference lies between these scenarios and a tribe's regulation of
fee land sales. The Marshall Trilogy contemplates this difference and provides
for it. Sadly both for tribes and the legal doctrine of stare decisis, the Marshall
Trilogy of foundational Indian law cases today exists chiefly to be
undermined: an ancestor venerated in memory but thwarted in legacy by its
forgetful progeny, for whom Montana has become a sacred text imbued with
an import out of all proportion to the actual content and context of its words.
What Montana does say-on its face and on its facts-is that a tribe cannot

(holding a tribe may not impose an occupancy tax on non-Indian guests of hotel located on
nonmember-owned reservation fee land)). Guided by Montana, the Court in Atkinson found
the tribal tax in question an impermissible assertion of tribal authority over nonmembers, and
thus "presumptively invalid," Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 659, because the non-Indian hotel guests
and the Navajo Nation had not entered a "consensual relationship [that] must stem from
'commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,"' id. at 655 (quoting Montana,
450 U.S. at 565). The facts of Plains Commerce Bank, however, resist easy comparison with
those of Atkinson. Hotel guests are rootless: travelers and transients, passing through on their
way to elsewhere. A bank is something else entirely, a fixed institution that is (or should be)
a pillar of constancy and stability, its fortunes insolubly intertwined with those of the
communities in which it operates. Even given the current jurisprudential reality of
"presumptively invalid" tribal civil authority over nonmembers, it is for entities such as the
Bank (with its complex, continuous, and consensualconnections to the Longs, their ranch, and
their tribe) that Montana'sexceptions to this "general rule" exist.
149. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) ("The Indian nations
had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil .....
150. Id. at 561.
151. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
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assert authority over nonmembers "beyond what is necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations,"'1 2 a statement qualified by
two exceptions through which tribes can "exercise some forms of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indianfee
lands."'51 3 Thus, while Montana certainly limits the previous scope of tribal
sovereignty, the most convincing reading of its limitation in view of the
Court's earlier precedent indicates simply that a tribal regulation of
nonmember conduct will be found invalid only when that conduct fails to bear
on tribal interests in a direct and obvious way."5 This interpretation most
closely comports with Montana's actual (and narrow) holding that the Crow
Tribe of Montana could not regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on
non-Indian-owned reservation fee land because the non-Indian sportsmen
"[did] not enter any agreement or dealings with the Crow Tribe so as to subject
themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction," nor did their "hunting and fishing on
fee lands imperil the subsistence or welfare of the Tribe." '
The modem Court's interpretation of Montana's "general rule" misreads
Montana by radically narrowing the extent of "what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government,"' 56 a result likely unintended by the Court in Montana.
The Court's cramped misreading of Montanaimposes a hard reality on Indian
tribes: the ungenerous "general rule," accepted without question by the Plains
Commerce Bank majority and dissenters alike, is here to stay. Yet through
Montana's exceptions, tribes may still hope to recover the meaningful measure
of sovereignty expressed by the Marshall Trilogy. The Court's error is in its

152. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
153. Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
154. See Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,449-50 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("When considered in the full context of the Court's other relevant
decisions, it is evident that Montana must be read to recognize the inherent authority of tribes
to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indian activities on tribal reservations where those
activities.., implicate a significant tribal interest."). The modem Court's canonization of the
Montana "general rule" has been by no means unanimously accepted either within or outside
the Court. Perhaps none has voiced objection more eloquently or authoritatively than Justice
Blackmun in his incisive Brendale dissent.
155. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. As Justice Blackmun explains in his Brendale dissent, "the
critical difficulty in Montanawas the Tribe's failure even to allege that the non-Indians whose
fishing and hunting it sought to regulate were in any measure affecting an identifiable tribal
interest." Brendale, 492 U.S. at 459 (plurality opinion) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted). Thus, tribal civil jurisdiction was improper in Montana because no significant tribal
interest was convincingly implicated, a situation readily contrasted with the Bank's
discriminatory sale of fee land.
156. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009

AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 33

misunderstanding of Montana'sgeneral rule, but the Court's sin is in its abuse
of Montana's exceptions.
2. The FirstMontana Exception: Real Estate Transactionsand Other
Harmless Nonactivities
The real, lasting importance of Montana for Indian tribes resides in the
magnanimity or flintiness with which the Court will apply its exceptions. In
light of the Marshall Trilogy's principles and the general currents of public
policy, only an expansive application of the exceptions will preserve tribal
integrity while fulfilling a legally supported ideal of self-determination:
achieving, in short, everything the Court in Plains Commerce Bank has not
done. The bulk of Plains Commerce Bank's analysis centers upon the
supposed inapplicability of the first Montana exception. The first Montana
exception permits tribal civil jurisdiction over "the activities of nonmembers
who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements."' 57 Logic,
experience, and common sense-all tools to which judges resort from time to
time, but any of which may be discarded to force a predetermined
outcome-indicate that a commercial real estate transaction qualifies as a
consensual business activity, one that a tribe may possess a reasonable interest
in regulating. Not so, however, in Plains Commerce Bank.
As Chief Justice Roberts explains, "Montana provides that, in certain
circumstances, tribes may exercise authority over the conduct of nonmembers,
even if that conduct takes place on non-Indian fee land. But conduct taking
place on the land and the sale of the land itself, are two very different things.' 58
Though "Montana and its progeny permit tribal regulation of nonmember
conduct inside the reservation that implicates the tribe's sovereign interests,"' 59
Chief Justice Roberts claims a tribe cannot regulate land sales because the act
of selling land is neither "conduct" nor "activity" within the contemplation of
Montana. He is mistaken. Montanarecognizes that "consensual relationships"
between Indians and non-Indians on a reservation involving "commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements" can and will affect tribal
interests, "even on non-Indian fee lands,"'6 thus creating an exception to the

157. Id. at 565.
158. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2726

(2008).
159. Id. at 2721.
160. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
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"general rule" stating tribes ordinarily would not have jurisdiction over
nonmember activity.
The sale of land on a reservation, even of non-Indian fee land, carries with
it issues of ownership, development, and identity that necessarily impact
significant tribal interests. This situation did not arise between the Crow Tribe
and the non-Indian hunters and fishermen in Montana. But it does arise here.
A non-Indian bank with a "lengthy and complex"'' history of dealing with the
Indian owners of an Indian corporation located on Indian land, that enters into
a "commercial dealing" with non-Indians under circumstances allegedly
involving discriminatory practices and breach of contract toward the prior
Indian landowners, fits the very model of an entity subject to tribal civil
jurisdiction under the first Montana exception, making jurisdiction presumptively valid.
Chief Justice Roberts, however, would require a showing that the "conduct"
or "activity" sought to be regulated by tribes "had a discernable effect on the
tribe or its members."' 62 Again, Chief Justice Roberts pushes the Court's logic
through the looking-glass. As the Court finds the act of selling land is not an
"activity," the result of the sale cannot have a direct "effect" so far as the tribe
is concerned. The majority acknowledges the existence of "certain forms of
nonmember behavior... [that] may sufficiently affect the tribe as to justify
tribal oversight," as "may" arise with "certain activities on non-Indian fee land
(say, a business enterprise employing tribal members) or certain uses (say,
commercial development)." '63 These include "the sale of merchandise by a
non-Indian to an Indian on the reservation,"'"' taxable "economic activity by
nonmembers... 'taking place or situated on Indian lands,"", 165 and apparently
not much else.
The Court in Plains Commerce Bank thus fashions an elegant and
impenetrable syllogism: only "activities" have a discernable effect on tribes;
the sale of land is not an "activity;" therefore, the sale of land has no
discernable effect on tribes. With no "discernable effect" on tribal interests,
the tribe has no interests to regulate or protect. Vastly circumscribing the
realm of nonmember "activities" over which a tribe may exercise its sovereign

161. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2728 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
162. Id.at2721.
163. Id.at2723.
164. Id.at 2721 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)).
165. Id.(quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes ofthe Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 153 (1980)) (holding Indian tribes have authority to impose taxes on cigarettes sold
to non-Indian purchasers on tribal land).
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powers, the Court effectively negates the genuine possibility of Indian selfdetermination by nakedly ignoring the existence of tribal interests worth
protecting.
The Court justifies its exclusion of land sales from tribal regulation by
claiming non-Indian-owned fee land in fact no longer exists as Indian land:
"The tribe cannot justify regulation of such land's sale by reference to its
power to superintend tribal land ...

because non-Indian fee parcels have

ceased to be tribal land."' 66 To an extent, the Court speaks accurately.
Ownership of non-Indian fee land has quite obviously passed, by definition,
"from Indian to non-Indian hands,"' 167 while the (now thoroughly discredited)
legacy of federal allotment policy has left "millions of acres of non-Indian fee
land located within the contiguous borders of Indian tribes,"'68 including the
land at issue in PlainsCommerceBank. But the equally obvious fact remains
that the tribal reservation still wholly embraces the non-Indian fee acreage.'69
Consequently, occurrences on the non-Indian-owned land can-and most
assuredly will--directly (sometimes detrimentally, sometimes destructively)
affect the integrity of the tribe whose reservation encompasses the fee land.
When this happens, the tribe must have the right to regulate events on those
lands as a matter of nothing less than self-preservation. It is blindness, or
active malice, to pretend otherwise. 7
A tribe has a very serious interest in ensuring the land remaining under its
immediate control is not pocked and scarred by outsiders over whom they have
little or no actual control. For this reason, Montana's exceptions apply "even
on non-Indian fee lands."'' By extending its exceptions to non-Indian fee
lands, Montana affirrns the need to preserve tribal interests that survive the
transfer of ownership from Indians to non-Indians. Plains Commerce Bank's

166. Id.at 2723.
167. Id.at 2724.
168. Id. at2719.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544,557 (1975) ("Indian tribes are unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.");
see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) (describing Indian tribes as
"distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is
exclusive....").
170. See Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,457-58 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he nature of land ownership does not diminish the tribe's
inherent power to regulate in the area. ... [The] fundamental sovereign power of local
governments to control land use is especially vital to Indians, who enjoy a unique historical and
cultural connection to the land.").
171. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
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majority insists that once land passes in fee from the tribe to non-Indians, "the
mere resale of that land works no additional intrusion on tribal relations or
self-government. Resale, by itself, causes no additional damage."' 7 2 Do not
believe it. If anything, the potential for harm only grows with each resale
because, if the sale of land involves something bearing the potential to affect
a tribe adversely, the tribe can only sit mutely until the harm materializes. And
even then the tribe's attempt at regulation will be viewed as presumptively
invalid. With the power to oversee nonmember real estate transactions
conducted within a reservation's boundaries, a tribe can effectively preempt
the possibility, perhaps even the likelihood, of alienated land becoming the
'
locus of "noxious uses,"173
activities, conduct, or behavior negatively
impacting the right of the tribe to function as a cohesive territorial unit. Land
is a people's destiny, and to lose control over land is to lose control of the
course of that destiny, to invite chaos and ruin, and to cede the future and slip
into history a shade of greatness eternally renounced and of possibility forever
lost.
3. The Second Montana Exception: Possibly Disappointingto the Tribe
The second Montana exception acknowledges a tribe's civil authority to
regulate nonmember conduct "when that conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe."' 7 4 In declining to apply the second Montana exception to the
Longs' situation, the Court sets an absurdly high standard for the exception's
application, essentially vitiating the possibility of its use. Under Plains
Commerce Bank's construction, "conduct must do more than injure the tribe,
it must 'imperil the subsistence' of the tribal community."' 175 According to the
majority, demonstrating a direct effect alone is insufficient to create a tenable
tribal regulatory interest. Rather,76the effect of the conduct must rise to the
level of "menace" or catastrophe.
Chief Justice Roberts opines that "[t]he sale of formerly Indian-owned fee
land to a third party is quite possibly disappointing to the tribe, but cannot

172. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2724.
173. Id.
174. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
175. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2726 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
Though Montana suggests that nonmember conduct must "threaten" or "imperil" a tribe to
warrant tribal regulation, the "threat" standard is also used disjunctively with the presumably
lesser requirement of "some direct effect." Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
176. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2726.
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fairly be called 'catastrophic' for tribal self-government.""' With perhaps
more than a whisper of condescension, Chief Justice Roberts refuses to engage
with the reality of a fee land sale ever impacting an Indian tribe significantly,
much less catastrophically. Though PlainsCommerce Bank's treatment of the
second Montana exception is perfunctory at best, it speaks volumes about the
Court's barely concealed distaste for upholding effective assertions of tribal
sovereignty. By creating impossible standards for the application of the
second Montana exception, the Court appears to manifest a belief that tribes
are not capable-or worthy---of exercising actual jurisdiction over nonIndians.
B. EstablishingNonmember Consent to Tribal CourtJurisdiction
The Court's analysis of whether the Bank consented to the jurisdiction of
the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court flows primarily from its interpretation
of the first Montana exception and bears all the flaws of that misreading. The
Court performs impressive feats of legal acrobatics to allow the Bank to escape
the tribal court's jurisdiction. Insisting the tribe has no power to regulate the
Bank's land sale, Chief Justice Roberts writes that such regulation "runs the
risk of subjecting nonmembers to tribal regulatory authority without
commensurate consent."' Fair enough, but the Court substantially downplays
the ways in which the Bank could have reasonably consented to the
jurisdiction of the tribal court.
The Court says tribal regulation "may be fairly imposed on nonmembers
' 79
only if the nonmember has consented, either expressly or by his actions."'
By any rational measure, the Bank consented to tribal court jurisdiction, both
expressly and by its actions. Unfortunately, the Plains Commerce Bank
majority does not truly employ rational measures in determining the absence
of jurisdiction. Instead, the Court simply sidesteps the indubitable fact of the
Bank's consent by returning to its specious dichotomy between permissibly
regulable "activities" and sales of fee land, finding "the tribe's inherent
sovereign authority" implicated in no way that would make the Montana
exceptions applicable.'
By this familiar logic, sales of fee lands are not
activities, do not have a discemable effect on the tribe, and so cannot be the
object of tribal regulation. Thus, the Bank could not have consented to the

177.
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179.
180.

Id.
Id. at 2724.
Id.
Id.
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tribal court's jurisdiction because the tribal court had no power to adjudicate
in the first place.
This sweeping denial of tribal court jurisdiction allows the Court to engage
with the consent issue in the most conclusory fashion with zero analysis. Only
by reciting the artificial sale/activity distinction can the Court negate the fact
of the Bank's consent, both explicit and implicit. In numerous ways the Bank
manifested consent "by its actions," stemming from its extensive history of
business dealings with the Longs. The majority nearly admits as much,
conceding "[tihe Bank may reasonably have anticipated that its various
commercial dealings with the Longs could trigger tribal authority to regulate
those transactions ' under the first Montana exception. Yet because the one
commercial dealing directly at issue in Plains Commerce Bank, the sale of fee
land, can admit of no tribal regulation whatsoever, "there is no reason the
Bank should have anticipated that its general business dealings with [the
Longs] would permit" tribal regulation of the Bank's sale of fee land.' 82
Through its emphatic refusal to include sales of fee land within the reach of
Montana'sexceptions, the Court warps the generally understood meanings of
both commerce and consent.
In its rush to render tribal courts powerless over nonmembers, the Court
quite possibly distorts even the Bank's understanding of commercial dealings
and consent to adjudication. The Bank had, after all, petitioned the tribal court
to serve an eviction notice upon the Longs.8 3 Though the Court without
discussion finds that this action on the part of the Bank "does not... constitute
consent for future litigation in the Tribal Court," it neglects to mention other
compelling instances in which the Bank expressly acknowledged tribal court
jurisdiction." 4 It is left to the dissenting opinion to note "the Bank regularly
filed suit" in Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court and, more significantly, that
in its motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim against the Longs "the
Bank stated, without qualification, that the tribal court 'ha[d] jurisdiction over
the subject matter of this action.'""85 The Bank appears ready to acknowledge
the jurisdiction of the tribal court whenever convenient. Under other
circumstances the Bank's actions would almost certainly swell into valid
consent and create an overwhelming presumption in favor ofjurisdiction. But
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Id.at2715.
Id.at2727.
Id.at 2729 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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for the fact this case involves an Indian forum, the Court would have found
jurisdiction proper and consent properly given.
V. Impact
In Plains Commerce Bank the Supreme Court takes from Indian tribes their
voice in the disposition of land within their reservations when that land
happens to be owned by non-Indians. In effect the Court says such land can
be bought and sold with no thought given to the sale's ramifications on the
surrounding community. The repercussions of Plains Commerce Bank,
however, will echo far beyond its holding on fee land sales. The Court does
not speak with enough bluntness to say Indian rights do not matter as much as
non-Indian rights, but its holding and profoundly flawed underlying rationale
unmistakably reinforce this conclusion. By mandating the atrophy of tribal
courts-and thus consigning Indian tribes to the periphery of American
jurisprudence-the Court simultaneously condemns those tribes to the margins
of social, economic, and political development, with no immediate hope of
improvement. Shorn of effective powers of governance over their territory,
tribes will have no chance of becoming anything other than passive economic
actors on a stage they possess but cannot hope to control.
A. Marginalization: The Impact on Tribal Economies
To speak of poverty and Indian reservations is usually to speak
redundantly." 6 The Cheyenne River Sioux have felt this commonplace truth
persistently and painfully. The lands of the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian
Reservation extend over almost the entirety of two north-central South Dakota
counties, Dewey and Ziebach.' 87 Among the absolute poorest anywhere in the
nation, 29.1 percent of Dewey County'88 and 55.9 percent of Ziebach County
residents'89 lived below the national poverty line in 2004-more than double
and quadruple the amount, respectively, of people living in poverty in South
Dakota as a whole. Endemic poverty consumes the social and psychological

186. See STEPHEN CORNELL & JOSEPH P. KALT, PATHWAYS FROM POVERTY: ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTION-BUILDING ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 3 (1989)
("As is well known, by most indicators of economic well-being, American Indian reservations
are extremely poor.").
187. PlainsCommerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2715.
188. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUIcKFACTS: DEWEY COUNTY, SOUTH
DAKOTA (2007), availableat http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/statesf46/46041.html.
189. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS: ZIEBACH COUNTY, SOUTH
DAKOTA (2007), availableat http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/46/46137.html.
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fabric of reservation life, leading to a plague of attendant social ills' probably
well-rehearsed enough not to need enumeration here. And poverty is a total
condition, neither beginning nor ending with the plain fact of not having
money. A lack of material wealth reflects the present inability to share in the
opportunities and resources capable of generating that wealth. This inability
to access the means of achieving prosperity exists in tandem with a lack of
significant participation in determining how that prosperity may be obtained,
developed, and regulated: the real issue at the heart ofPlains Commerce Bank.
For the Cheyenne River Sioux and other Indian tribes, economic
development intertwines unavoidably with the ability to self-govern
effectively. Put another way, "[e]conomy follows sovereignty."'' A people
without the right to manage their own land and natural resources will never
achieve economic success in the true sense of the term, for any "success" will
have been borrowed and bestowed by outsiders and therefore can never truly
be their own. Passivity will never conquer poverty. Today's Court implicitly
acknowledges this fundamental economic and political truth, but in the wrong
direction.
In doing so the Court staggers far behind the general tilt of modem public
policy. The United States Congress, for example, has gradually come to
appreciate the need for vigorous tribal self-determination on Indian
reservations. Recognizing that "the Indian people will never surrender their
desire to control their relationships both among themselves and with nonIndian governments, organizations, and persons,"'" Congress has finally
affirmed not only "the strong expression of the Indian people for selfdetermination"'9 3 but also the crucial connection between self-determination

190. See, e.g., CORNELL & KALT, supra note 186, at 4 ("Hand-in-hand with economic
distress go many of the social indicators commonly associated with poverty.").
191. Id. at 40. Professors Cornell and Kalt,who have exhaustively and eloquently explored
the subject oftribal economic development, go on to note that"[t]he most striking characteristic
of the relatively successful tribes we have studied is that they have aggressively made the tribe
itself the effective decision-maker in reservation affairs." Id.; see also Stephen Cornell &
Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chancesfor Economic Development on
American Indian Reservations,in WHAT CAN TRIBES Do?: STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN
AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1, 8 (Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds.,
1995) ("[A]s sovereignty rises, so do the chances of successful development."). Expressed yet
more emphatically, "Sovereignty is one of the primary development resources tribes now have,
and the reinforcement of tribal sovereignty under self-determination should be the central thrust
of Indian policy." Id.at 16.
192. 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)(2) (2006).
193. Id. § 450a(a).
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and the tribes' "social and economic well-being."'" Granted, the Supreme
Court recognizes this connection in Plains Commerce Bank, but with
unalloyed disdain. Rather than using the mighty force of law to foster further
economic progress on Indian reservations, the Court instead manipulates
policy and precedent to reverse the course of tribal self-determination, handing
a resounding legal victory to opportunistic non-Indian bankers. Such an
outcome inspires confidence in neither commerce, nor capitalism, nor the
Court: each a pillar of American strength, each degraded in the eyes of Indians
by Plains Commerce Bank. The Court has spoken, but justice sleeps.
The Cheyenne River Sioux, and by extension all Indian tribes, had a
concrete chance for simultaneous economic, legal, and political advancement
when the United States Supreme Court heard PlainsCommerce Bank. Rather
than fulfilling that long-overdue promise, the Court rendered a decision
increasing the marginalization of Indian tribes under the imprimatur of the
highest Court in the land, the one for whom "it is emphatically the province
and duty.., to say what the law is."' 95 But this Court misspoke. This in itself
is not so inconceivable. Many (including five or so Supreme Court Justices)
would likely say that allowing Indian tribes to regulate-not to dominate or
manipulate but simply to oversee prudently-real estate transactions within the
greater boundaries of tribal lands between and among non-Indians is
somehow "un-American." After all, it allows Indians to tell non-Indians how
to manage their affairs. But such reasoning forgets, or callously rejects, that
Indians tribal members are Americans, and the rights they seek are American
rights. When a society, a nation, or a people cannot freely develop itself
politically and economically, others will happily undertake such development
for them for so long as profit can be obtained. This is the very definition of
exploitation. It represents everything America should not and must not be, for
Indians or for anyone else.
With Plains Commerce Bank, the Court increases the marginalization,
political and economic, of Indian tribes. Life on the margins of a larger
society breeds poverty and alienation, along with the self-obliterating desire
to dull the blows of that poverty through escapes both temporary and
permanent. As long as economic development for Indian tribes means little
more than the chance to make some money from the hungry vices of non-

194. Id. § 450a(c); see also CORNELL & KALT, supra note 186, at 23 ("If external
actors-governments, corporations, publics-effectively control events and decisions on
reservations, then the chances of self-determined economic development are severely
reduced.").
195. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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Indians in the form of casinos and smokeshops or to wring some tax revenue
from outsiders who extract and carry off the tribes' mineral wealth, then tribes
will remain imprisoned by underdevelopment. Without the power to direct the
creation of sustainable wealth in the present, Indian tribes will have no
effective stake in their own future.
B. Powerlessness:The Impact on Tribal Courts
In Plains Commerce Bank the Supreme Court also forecloses upon the
development of tribal court systems on reservations, dismissively branding
tribal courts as purveyors of some lesser law. No sustainable good can grow
in the absence of effective, enforceable laws. In spite of, or perhaps because
of, the fact that "[fjair and effective tribal court systems are now recognized
as important elements of economic development,"' 196 Plains Commerce Bank
greatly constricts the jurisdictional authority of the tribal judiciary. Economic
marginalization demands political powerlessness on the part of the
marginalized. Political powerlessness requires the constant undermining of the
growth and development of effective governing institutions. By undercutting
the ability of tribal courts to develop and implement a body of law that can
respond to the unique needs of the tribe while integrating itself within the
larger framework of American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
simultaneously disserves the interests of the tribe and the interests of justice,
which here are inseparable.
Axiomatically, sustainable development requires the ability to attract,
solidify, and maintain the investments of capital that will spur and perpetuate
that development. For many Indian tribes, often isolated and always
underdeveloped, the threshold step of attracting investment (as distinct from
enduring opportunistic exploitation) remains achingly unrealized-and will
remain unfulfilled under the draconian jurisdictional regime imposed byPlains
Commerce Bank. No economically justifiable impetus for sustainable capital
investment will exist so long as tribes stand precluded from providing a
meaningful measure of governmental authority within their territory: an
authority springing from sovereign rights, expressed in tribal law, and justly
applied by tribal courts. For any people, "capable institutions of governance are
necessary for any sustained, successful development.' ' 97 In the specific context
of tribal economic development on reservations, "capital access is first and
foremost a problem of political development: the establishment of an

196. CoHEN, supra note 12, at 1321.
197. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 191, at 45.
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institutional environment in which investors feel secure."' 8 Potential investors
in tribal economic development-at least those working in good faith toward
a mutually beneficial relationship-thus obtain confidence from the assertion,
rather than the absence, of effective tribal law.
Law gives voice to the values of a community, and courts give life to the
law. This holds no less true for Indian tribes than for any other people or
polity. The Plains Commerce Bank majority apparently believes tribal courts
will treat nonmembers as inherently suspect interlopers rather than as parties
entitled to an evenhanded and impartial administration of justice. This
burdensome stigma, much more reflective of the Court's disdain for tribal
sovereignty than of any actual prejudice exhibited by tribal courts toward
nonmembers, will necessarily-and nefariously--curb the creation of "a
capable, independent tribal judicial system that can uphold contracts, enforce
stable business codes, settle disputes, and, in effect, protect businesses from
politics."' 99
In curtailing the authority of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court to hear
cases arising within its own jurisdictional boundaries, the Supreme Court
reinforces the pernicious lie that Indian tribes are a strange and alien race
governed by crude and primitive rules to which no white man need submit.
Yet the path of the law does not deviate or dissolve upon reaching the
boundaries of an Indian reservation and neither do the fundamental
responsibilities of those reservations' courts, which at a very basic level must
embody, for example, a system of justice "capable of enforcing workable
business codes and the law of contract." 2" At root, law provides protection
and predictability in the face of uncertainty, and the absence of such protection
will inspire confidence in no one."° ' The bounty of sustainable, substantial,
sovereign success will not fall on nations who have lost "the right ...to make
their own laws and be ruled by them."20 2
With Plains Commerce Bank the Supreme Court evinces a hostility to
Indian tribes far more corrosive than would ever realistically exist in tribal
courts against non-Indian parties. A nation of laws can secure its vitality and
legitimacy only through the strength of its legal institutions. If allowed to
flourish, tribal courts will offer a promise of consistency and stability for the

198. Id.at 11.
199. Id. at 30.
200. Id.at 40-41.
201. See id.
at4l ("Without courts and judges... that can resolve disputes in ways that keep
the rules of the game stable and free of politics, investors will refuse to launch enterprises.").
202. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
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tribe and those who seek to participate in the tribe's economic life. Far from
being a threat to nonmembers, tribal courts will instead serve as the guardians
and guarantors of sustainable economic prosperity on reservations. For the
present, this must remain the hopeful ideal for tribal development and not the
reality: for between the idea and the reality falls the shadow of Plains
Commerce Bank, which in divesting tribal courts of legitimate adjudicatory
powers within their rightful jurisdictional boundaries guards the rights of
neither tribes nor investors and guarantees only the continued underdevelopment of Indian economies.
VI. Conclusion
In Plains Commerce Bank the United States Supreme Court held that Indian
tribes lack authority to regulate the sale of non-Indian-owned fee land located
within their own reservations. Relying upon unstable precedent and indefensible
policy, the Court's decision robs Indian tribes not only of a significant portion
of their inherent sovereignty but also of their ability to direct their own economic
future. Deprived of effective political and legal institutions and thus lacking the
power to generate sustainable economic development on reservations, tribes will
continue to confront a future of dependency and destitution-a future bleak and
blighted and so perhaps no future at all.
PlainsCommerce Bank finds no foundation in law: neither the legacy of the
Marshall Trilogy nor the policy ofthe Montanaexceptions validly embraces the
decision. Plains Commerce Bank bears no basis in logic: the belabored
distinction between sales of land and activities upon such land suffocates in its
own speciousness. Finally, PlainsCommerce Bank secures no solace from the
rightly exalted American ideal of self-determination: by denying tribes the
rightful freedom to chart the course of their own reasoned yet free development,
the Court commits an error that staggers somewhere between a blunder and a
crime. And so justice slips away from the Sioux. The Bank began treating
them badly, but the Supreme Court treated them far worse.
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